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COLLISION OF NEGLIGENCE THEORY:  DOES A 
“BLACKOUT” CONSTITUTE AN UNAVOIDABLE, SUDDEN 
EMERGENCY IN NORTH DAKOTA? 
ABSTRACT 
 
In a personal injury lawsuit, an actor is negligent if four conditions 
exist:  the actor had a duty to the injured person; the actor breached the 
duty; a causal connection existed between the breach and the injury; and 
there was an actual injury.  What is lacking from the systematic framework 
is the contemplation of unanticipated events.  In response to this gap, courts 
have adopted several defenses and doctrines to protect those actors who 
experience an unforeseeable event and have to face the consequences.  One 
such defense is known as the “sudden medical emergency defense,” where 
the driver of an automobile suffers an unexpected medical problem, but no 
liability for the resulting accident occurs due to the uncontrollability of the 
event.  Similarly, the doctrines known as “sudden emergency,” when a 
driver is confronted with sudden peril and little time to react, and 
“unavoidable accident,” when a driver faces other external forces, also 
result in a finding of no negligence.  North Dakota has recognized excul-
pating doctrines and compensatory regimes, but has not yet addressed the 
sudden medical emergency defense.  Part II of this note will discuss the 
trends and developments of these concepts among jurisdictions.  Part III 
will then examine the concepts as applied in North Dakota, including appli-
cation under current law and under the potential adoption of the sudden 
medical emergency defense.  Part III will also explore the policy 
considerations of the defense as well as means to counter the defense. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In its most recognized and simplest form, an automobile accident case 
involves one driver accusing another driver of negligently causing an 
accident and any injuries stemming from the accident.1  In order to prevail 
on a claim of negligence, the accusing driver must prove the other driver 
owed a duty of care to him or her; the driver breached the duty; a causal 
connection existed between the breach and the injury; and there was an 
 
1. See, e.g., Harfield v. Tate, 1999 ND 166, ¶ 3, 598 N.W.2d 840, 842. 
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actual injury.2  Culpability is the crux of the negligence case, and without 
proving each of the necessary elements, no culpability results.3  However, 
even after establishing each of the four elements, exculpatory circumstances 
may exist.4 
Adding a fact to the scenario above—that the driver causing the 
accident claimed to have suffered a sudden medical emergency while 
driving—complicates the otherwise basic formula.  Although the driver 
experiencing a medical emergency was the cause of the accident and 
injuries, the driver may not have been able to control his or her actions.5  
With both an impossibility to control the automobile due to the medical 
event and an impossibility to anticipate the event’s occurrence, the driver 
may not be charged as negligent.6 
Cases decided under negligence theories have held a sudden medical 
emergency while driving “is a complete defense to an action based on negli-
gence,” if such emergency was not foreseeable.7  Part II of this note will 
discuss how the defense varies from state-to-state not only in name,8 but 
also in analysis,9 pleading requirements,10 and burden of proof.11  Part II 
will also examine how, despite the defense maintaining the same general 
 
2. Cf. Walketzko v. Herdegen, 226 N.W.2d 648, 652 (N.D. 1975). 
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (2010). 
4. Lutzkovitz v. Murray, 339 A.2d 64, 67 (Del. 1975). 
5. See Cohen v. Petty, 65 F.2d 820, 821 (D.C. 1933). 
6. Id. 
7. Timothy E. Travers, Annotation, Liability for Automobile Accident Allegedly Caused by 
Driver’s Blackout, Sudden Unconsciousness, or the Like, 93 A.L.R.3d 326, 330 (1979 & Supp. 
2010). 
8. See, e.g., Estate of Embry v. GEO Transp. of Ind., Inc., 395 F. Supp. 2d 517, 520 (E.D. 
Ky. 2005) (“blackout” defense); Halligan v. Broun, 645 S.E.2d 581, 582 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (“act 
of God”); Parker v. Washington, 421 P.2d 861, 866 (Okla. 1966) (“unavoidable accident by 
reason of sudden unconsciousness”); McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 154 (Tenn. 1995) 
(“sudden loss of physical capacity or consciousness”). 
9. Compare Cruz v. United States, 987 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (D. Haw. 1997) (“In determining 
whether a driver’s incapacity to control his vehicle was foreseeable, courts generally consider a 
number of factors”), with Caron v. Guiliano, 211 A.2d 705, 706 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1965) (holding 
foreseeability issue is a jury question).  
10. Compare Storjohn v. Fay, 519 N.W.2d 521, 526 (Neb. 1994) (the defense is plead as an 
affirmative defense), with Tropical Exterminators, Inc. v. Murray, 171 So. 2d 432, 434 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1965) (the defense is not pled as an affirmative defense). 
11. Compare Lutzkovitz v. Murray, 339 A.2d 64, 67 (Del. 1975) (maintaining that once the 
plaintiff establishes a prima facie negligence case, the burden shifts to the defendant to show a 
sudden medical emergency), with Myers v. Sutton, 189 S.E.2d 336, 338 (Va. 1972) (stating “[t]he 
burden of proof in a negligence case is always on the plaintiff . . . ”).  Compare also Freese v. 
Lemmon, 267 N.W.2d 680, 685-86 (Iowa 1978) (providing that defendants must prove uncon-
sciousness by a preponderance of the evidence), with Brannon v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 507 So. 2d 
194, 197 (La. 1987) (holding “the party asserting the affirmative defense of sudden uncon-
sciousness to a negligence claim must prove the facts giving rise to the defense by clear and 
convincing evidence”). 
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elements across the jurisdictions that have adopted it,12 other negligence 
doctrines contain similar elements, possibly resulting in confusion or 
overlap.13 
North Dakota has endorsed doctrines allowing the defendant in an 
automobile collision case to escape liability, but no cases have directly 
addressed the sudden medical emergency defense.14  Part III of this note 
will discuss how current controlling law in North Dakota may sufficiently 
cover a case presenting a sudden medical emergency in a negligence action, 
but explicit adoption of the defense would be in line with the majority of 
jurisdictions.15  In order to properly consider the drastic adoption limiting 
the recovery of injured plaintiffs who bring suit against incapacitated 
drivers, Part III will also explore important policy considerations that must 
be taken into account,16 as well as the means to attack the defense.17 
II. SUDDEN MEDICAL EMERGENCY 
The sudden medical emergency defense, or its functional equivalent by 
another name, is found in many jurisdictions.18  The development of the 
defense has primarily been through common law and courts’ analysis of 
negligence elements.19  Despite general acceptance of the elements, the 
defense varies from state-to-state in the scope of its use.20  Additionally, 
during the development of the sudden medical emergency defense, courts 
 
12. See, e.g., Abreu v. F.E. Dev. Recycling, Inc., 35 So. 3d 968, 969 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2010) (“To establish the defense of sudden and unexpected loss of capacity or unconsciousness, 
the defendant must prove . . .  1. The defendant suffered a loss of consciousness or capacity.  2. 
The loss of consciousness or capacity occurred before the defendant’s purportedly negligent 
conduct.  3. The loss of consciousness was sudden.  4. The loss of consciousness or capacity was 
neither foreseen, nor foreseeable.”) (internal citations omitted). 
13. Compare 8 AM. JUR. 2D Automobiles § 1057 (“The defense of an unavoidable accident 
is . . . a claim that an accident was unavoidable . . . because of some other circumstance beyond 
the operator’s control . . . .”), with Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Modern Status of Sudden 
Emergency Doctrine, 10 A.L.R.5th 680, 687 (1993 & Supp. 2010) (noting the sudden emergency 
defense occurs when a driver “is confronted with a sudden emergency and lacks time to judge 
with certainty the best course to pursue . . . ”). 
14. See Harfield v. Tate, 1999 ND 166, ¶ 11, 598 N.W.2d 840, 843 (describing the sudden 
emergency doctrine); Reuter v. Olson, 59 N.W.2d 830, 835-36 (N.D. 1953) (explaining the 
unavoidable accident doctrine). 
15. See Travers, supra note 7, at 330 (noting majority viewpoints). 
16. See Roman v. Estate of Gobbo, 791 N.E.2d 422, 433-34 (Ohio 2003) (Pfeifer, J., 
concurring). 
17. David M. Kopstein, Defeat the “Sudden Medical Emergency” Defense, TRIAL, Feb. 
2009, at 24. 
18. Travers, supra note 7, at 330. 
19. See generally Roman, 791 N.E.2d at 426-33 (explaining the basis, development, and 
majority viewpoint of the sudden medical emergency defense). 
20. See infra Part II.A. 
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have adopted other similar doctrines utilized when a driver is faced with 
broader, unexpected circumstances.21 
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUDDEN MEDICAL EMERGENCY DEFENSE 
Under common law, an actor is considered negligent if he or she owed 
a duty to the person who was injured; if he or she breached the duty; if a 
causal connection existed between the breach and the injury; and if an 
injury actually resulted.22  Generally, a driver of a motor vehicle owes a 
duty to pedestrians and other drivers to exercise ordinary and reasonable 
care.23  A driver breaches the duty of care and, consequentially, may be 
liable for injuries if he or she suddenly loses consciousness or suffers a 
medical emergency while driving, but only if the driver was aware the 
emergency could occur.24  On the other hand, if the driver was unaware the 
medical emergency could occur, the driver may escape liability.25 
A sudden loss of consciousness, or “sudden medical emergency” as the 
defense will be referred to throughout this note, has been recognized as a 
complete defense in many jurisdictions.26  The defense has been raised for a 
variety of different conditions, including epileptic seizures,27 diabetic 
shock,28 heart attack,29 and other conditions resulting in unconsciousness.30  
In order to fall under the scope of the defense, the alleged incapacitation 
may only need to result in a condition severe enough to suddenly lose 
control of the vehicle, rather than unconsciousness,31 unless uncon-
sciousness is an element of the defense.32 
Typically, the sudden medical emergency defense states “an operator 
of a motor vehicle who, while driving, becomes suddenly stricken by a 
 
21. See infra Part II.B. 
22. See Waletzko v. Herdegen, 226 N.W.2d 648, 652 (N.D. 1975). 
23. 17 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 1 (2010). 
24. Id. 
25. Id. § 5. 
26. See generally Travers, supra note 7 (citing cases from Alabama, Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and 
Wisconsin). 
27. Storjohn v. Fay, 519 N.W.2d 521, 527 (Neb. 1994). 
28. Howle v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 344 S.E.2d 157, 159 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986). 
29. Roman v. Estate of Gobbo, 791 N.E.2d 422, 424 (Ohio 2003). 
30. Abreu v. F.E. Dev. Recycling, Inc., 35 So. 3d 968, 969 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (brain 
aneurism); Renell v. Argonaut Liquor Co., 365 P.2d 239, 241 (Colo. 1961) (overexhaustion). 
31. See Kopstein, supra note 17, at 24. 
32. See Word v. Jones ex rel. Moore, 516 S.E.2d 144, 147 (N.C. 1999) (noting the defense as 
adopted, the “sudden-incapacitation defense,” does not require unconsciousness as an element). 
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fainting spell or loses consciousness from an unforeseen cause, and is 
unable to control the vehicle, is not chargeable with negligence . . . .”33  As 
noted by most courts, the rationale of the defense is “that the driver was 
suddenly deprived of his senses by ‘blacking out’ so that he could not com-
prehend the nature and quality of his act, and thusly, is not responsible 
therefor.”34  While the general premise maintains uniformity among juris-
dictions,35 several details involving the name of the defense, foreseeability 
analysis and extent of the defense, the burdens of proof on the plaintiff and 
the defendant, and the pleading requirements lack such uniformity.36 
1. A Defense by Different Names 
Depending on the jurisdiction, the defense of a driver experiencing an 
unforeseen medical event while driving has been called by different 
names.37  Some jurisdictions have explicitly given the defense a name such 
as the “sudden-medical-emergency-defense,”38 the “‘blackout’ defense,”39 
the “defense of sudden or unanticipated unconsciousness,”40 or the “sudden 
loss of consciousness defense.”41  Other jurisdictions have classified sudden 
unconsciousness under the “unavoidable accident defense,”42 or as “an act 
of God.”43  However, many jurisdictions merely define the defense without 
giving it a specific name.44 
 
33. Roman, 791 N.E.2d at 427; see also Bashi v. Wodarz, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 635, 638 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1996); Cohen v. Petty, 65 F.2d 820, 821 (D.C. 1933); Tropical Exterminators, Inc. v. 
Murray, 171 So. 2d 432, 433 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).  
34. Moore v. Presnell, 379 A.2d 1246, 1249 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (citing 2 FOWLER 
HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 16.7 (1956)); see also Storjohn v. Fay, 519 
N.W.2d 521, 526 (Neb. 1994).  The Restatements also have provided guidance to courts by stating 
“an automobile driver who suddenly and quite unexpectedly suffers a heart attack does not 
become negligent when he loses control of his car and drives it in a manner which would 
otherwise be unreasonable; but one who knows that he is subject to such attacks may be 
negligent . . . .”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 3, § 283C, cmt. c. 
35. See 17 AM. JUR. 3D, supra note 23, § 5. 
36. See infra Parts II.A.1-3. 
37. See Kopstein, supra note 17, at 24. 
38. Roman, 791 N.E.2d at 427. 
39. Estate of Embry v. GEO Transp. of Ind., Inc., 395 F. Supp. 2d 517, 520 (E.D. Ky. 2005) 
(also explaining that “blackout” includes “sudden incapacity”). 
40. See Brannon v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 507 So. 2d 194, 197 (La. 1987) (defense of sudden 
unconsciousness); Moore v. Presnell, 379 A.2d 1246, 1249 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (defense of 
unanticipated unconsciousness). 
41. Storjohn v. Fay, 519 N.W.2d 521, 526 (Neb. 1994); see also Tropical Exterminators, Inc. 
v. Murray, 171 So. 2d 432, 433 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (the “sudden unforeseeable loss of 
consciousness defense”); McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 154 (Tenn. 1995) (“the sudden loss 
of physical capacity or consciousness defense”). 
42. See Parker v. Washington, 421 P.2d 861, 866 (Okla. 1966). 
43. See Halligan v. Broun, 645 S.E.2d 581, 582 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (citing a statute defining 
“act of God” as “an accident produced by physical causes which are irresistible or inevitable, such 
as . . . illness” and such an act is the proximate cause of the accident rather than the defendant 
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2. Foreseeability Analysis 
While the name of the defense may vary, states that have adopted the 
sudden medical emergency defense require the same element:  the medical 
event allegedly causing the accident must have been sudden and unfore-
seeable.45  With such an important emphasis on foreseeability in finding for 
or against liability, some courts have focused their analysis on 
foreseeability factors.46  For instance, in Cruz v. United States,47 a truck 
driver experienced a heart block while driving, causing him to lose con-
sciousness and, subsequently, to lose control of his vehicle.48  On appeal, 
the district court needed to determine whether his condition was fore-
seeable, which would have imposed a duty of care to the injured plaintiff, 
Cruz.49  In deciding foreseeability, the court considered a variety of factors 
exposing the amount of knowledge the driver had with regard to possible 
incapacitation from past experience or medical advice.50  Other courts have 
 
driver); Hoggatt v. Melin, 172 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961) (defining an act of God as “all 
misfortunes and actions arising from the inevitable necessity which human prudence could not 
foresee or prevent and . . . sudden illness, or death, rendering the driver of a motor vehicle 
incapable of controlling or directing his motor vehicle, if unforeseeable and beyond the power of 
human agency to prevent . . .”); Travers, supra note 7, at 330.  But see Freifield v. Hennessy, 353 
F.2d 97, 99 (3d Cir. 1965) (loss of consciousness is “not so unusual and extraordinary as to 
warrant its being attributed to ‘an act of God’”). 
44. See, e.g., Bashi v. Wodarz, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 635, 638 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (stating the 
general rule regarding a driver stricken by a sudden illness); Caron v. Guiliano, 211 A.2d 705, 706 
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1965) (explaining a driver suddenly stricken by a fainting spell without warning 
cannot be negligent); Lutzkovitz v. Murray, 339 A.2d 64, 67 (Del. 1975) (stating a physically or 
mentally incapacitated driver cannot be liable if he had no warning of the incapacitation); Keller 
v. Wonn, 87 S.E.2d 453, 459 (W. Va. 1955) (explaining a driver who has no warning of physical 
or mental incapacity cannot be held liable for injuries occurring during incapacitation). 
45. Cf. Travers, supra note 7, at 330. 
46. See, e.g., Cruz v. United States, 987 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (D. Haw. 1997) (listing the 
factors courts generally consider to determine foreseeability of incapacitation). 
47. 987 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Haw. 1997). 
48. Cruz, 987 F. Supp. at 1301. 
49. Id. at 1302-03. 
50. Id.  Specifically, the court inquired as to: 
the extent of the driver’s awareness or knowledge of the condition that caused the 
sudden incapacity; whether the driver had sought medical advice or was under a 
physician’s care for the condition when the accident occurred; whether the driver had 
been prescribed, and had taken, medication for the condition; whether a sudden 
incapacity had previously occurred while driving; the number, frequency, extent, and 
duration of incapacitating episodes prior to the accident while driving and otherwise; 
the temporal relationship of the prior incapacitating episodes to the accident; a 
physician’s guidance or advice regarding driving to the driver, if any; and medical 
opinions regarding the nature of the driver’s condition, adherence to treatment, 
foreseeability of the incapacitation, and potential advance warnings which the driver 
would have experienced immediately prior to the accident. 
Id. 
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also considered these factors when determining foreseeability of the 
medical emergency.51 
On the other hand, other jurisdictions have explicitly left the issue of 
foreseeability and the consideration of foreseeability factors in the hands of 
the jury, or factfinder, to determine liability as a question of fact.52  
However, where the evidence is uncontroverted that the medical emergency 
was foreseeable, no fact issue is presented to the jury and the court may find 
the incapacitated driver liable as a matter of law.53  Judgment as a matter of 
law may also favor the incapacitated driver “if the evidence points to only 
one reasonable conclusion” that the attack was unforeseeable.54 
Although foreseeability plays an important role, events and factors 
leading up to the medical emergency and accident may impose liability on 
the incapacitated driver.55  For example, in Estate of Embry v. GEO 
Transportation of Indiana, Inc.,56 a district court in Kentucky rejected a 
driver’s “blackout” defense when he passed out due to choking on coffee.57  
Because the court determined the driver had a statutory duty to operate his 
truck in a safe manner and that he negligently drank the coffee, the driver 
could not escape liability.58  In such instances, the accident would be fore-
seeable because the blackout would not be the sole cause of the accident.59 
3. Pleading the Defense 
When asserting sudden medical emergency as a defense in a motor 
vehicle accident case, the defendant must be aware of the pleading require-
ments, which vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.60  Because liability 
under the sudden medical emergency defense hinges on the potentially 
negligent actions of the incapacitated driver, the defendant driver normally 
raises the defense.61  As such, one issue the defendant must determine is 
 
51. See McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 156 (Tenn. 1995). 
52. See Renell v. Argonaut Liquor Co., 365 P.2d 239, 242 (Colo. 1961) (“It [is] exclusively 
within the province of the jury to determine whether [the driver] knew or should have known that 
he might ‘black out’ or ‘faint’ because of exhaustion.”); Lutzkovitz v. Murray, 339 A.2d 64, 67 
(Del. 1975); Dickinson v. Koenig, 133 So. 2d 721, 723 (Miss. 1961) (tasking the jury with the 
determination of whether “the driver had been suddenly stricken by a fainting spell and had lost 
consciousness at a time when he had no previous warning, or reason to anticipate, that he was 
likely to be suddenly stricken and have a fainting spell as testified about”). 
53. See 17 AM. JUR. 3D, supra note 23, § 3. 
54. Storjohn v. Fay, 519 N.W.2d 521, 527 (Neb. 1994). 
55. See generally 17 AM. JUR. 3D, supra note 23, § 5 (explaining defense considerations). 
56. 395 F. Supp. 2d 517 (E.D. Ky. 2005). 
57. Estate of Embry, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 520. 
58. Id. at 520-21. 
59. Id. at 520. 
60. See 17 AM. JUR. 3D, supra note 23, § 3. 
61. Id. 
          
2011] NOTE 241 
whether the jurisdiction accepts the defense as an affirmative defense.62  
Generally, courts have accepted a sudden medical emergency as an 
affirmative defense,63 but other courts have held the contrary, stating a 
claim of incapacitation or unconsciousness is a general denial of negligence 
rather than an affirmative defense.64 
If a sudden medical emergency is characterized as an affirmative 
defense, most courts agree the defendant has the burden of proving the 
emergency.65  In other words, the burden of proving a sudden medical 
emergency occurred shifts to the defendant after the plaintiff proves each of 
the negligence elements.66  However, a minority of courts have held the 
burden of proof never shifts in a negligence case and, thus, the plaintiff 
maintains the ultimate burden of proof once the defendant merely comes 
forward with evidence of a sudden medical emergency.67 
Besides who has the burden of proof, the level of evidence sufficient to 
show a sudden medical emergency also differs among jurisdictions.68  Some 
jurisdictions require proving the sudden medical emergency defense and its 
“elements by a preponderance of the evidence.”69  Other jurisdictions 
require the heightened burden of proof:  clear and convincing evidence.70 
B. SIMILAR DEFENSES 
The sudden medical emergency defense, while narrow in context to 
sudden incapacitation or unconsciousness, is similar to other doctrines 
frequently utilized in automobile accident cases—namely, the sudden 
emergency doctrine and the unavoidable accident doctrine.71  Due to the 
similarities, confusion may result among the defenses and their 
 
62. See id. § 5. 
63. Storjohn v. Fay, 519 N.W.2d 521, 526 (Neb. 1994). 
64. See Tropical Exterminators, Inc. v. Murray, 171 So. 2d 432, 433-34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1965). 
65. See 17 AM. JUR. 3D, supra note 23, § 5; see also Lutzkovitz v. Murray, 339 A.2d 64, 67 
(Del. 1975); Moore v. Presnell, 379 A.2d 1246, 1248 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977); Storjohn, 519 
N.W.2d at 526. 
66. Moore, 379 A.2d at 1248; Storjohn, 519 N.W.2d at 526. 
67. See Myers v. Sutton, 189 S.E.2d 336, 338 (Va. 1972). 
68. See 17 AM. JUR. 3D, supra note 23, § 3. 
69. Word v. Jones ex rel. Moore, 516 S.E.2d 144, 147 (N.C. 1999); see Freese v. Lemmon, 
267 N.W.2d 680, 686-87 (Iowa 1978).  The preponderance of the evidence standard, the standard 
most often applied in civil trials, is described as one party having “the stronger evidence, however 
slight the edge may be.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1301 (9th ed. 2009). 
70. Brannon v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 507 So. 2d 194, 197 (La. 1987).  Clear and convincing 
evidence is an intermediate standard between a preponderance of the evidence and proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Id.  “The existence of the disputed fact must be highly probable; that is, much 
more probable than its nonexistence.”  Id. 
71. See generally 8 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 13 (explaining the doctrines of unavoidable 
accident, sudden emergency, or act of God). 
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applicability.72  However, despite possible overlap of the concepts, a 
noticeable difference is the general acceptance of the sudden medical 
emergency defense and the declining acceptance of the sudden emergency 
and unavoidable accident doctrines.73 
1. Sudden Emergency Doctrine 
The sudden emergency doctrine recognizes a driver is not liable for 
negligence if he or she was confronted with a sudden emergency and 
“exercised the care a reasonably prudent person would under like circum-
stances.”74  Most jurisdictions have addressed the sudden emergency 
doctrine and its use in automobile accident cases.75  Among these juris-
dictions, though, there is strong disagreement about whether the doctrine 
should be used in negligence cases.76 
a. Rationale 
The general principle behind the sudden emergency doctrine—that a 
person confronted with a sudden emergency is only expected to act as a 
reasonable person would in the same situation rather than under normal 
circumstances—is: 
[t]he actor is left no time for adequate thought, or is reasonably so 
disturbed or excited that the actor cannot weigh alternative courses 
of action, and must make a speedy decision, based very largely 
upon impulse or guess.  Under such conditions, the actor cannot 
reasonably be held to the same accuracy of judgment or conduct as 
one who has full opportunity to reflect, even though it later 
appears that the actor made the wrong decision, one which no 
 
72. See Kappelman v. Lutz, 217 P.3d 286, 290 (Wash. 2009) (elaborating on the sudden 
emergency doctrine and how it can easily blend into the unavoidable accident doctrine); see also 
Giles v. Smith, 435 S.E.2d 832, 834 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (“The doctrine of sudden emergency 
should not be confused with the defense of ‘unavoidable accident’”). 
73. Compare Roman v. Estate of Gobbo, 791 N.E.2d 422, 430-31 (Ohio 2003) (“[r]ecent 
decisions in many jurisdictions clearly indicate that there is no trend away from allowing a sudden 
and unforeseen medical emergency to serve as a complete defense to negligence in a motor 
vehicle liability case.”), with Ebach v. Ralston, 510 N.W.2d 604, 609 (N.D. 1994) (explaining 
how some courts have abolished or discouraged the use of the sudden emergency instruction in 
negligence actions). 
74. 8 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 13, § 821. 
75. See generally Ghent, supra note 13 (citing cases from Alabama, Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming). 
76. See id. at 687 (stating the doctrine has been subject to criticism by some courts). 
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reasonable person could possibly have made after due 
deliberation.77 
Therefore, the key factors in determining liability in the negligence 
context are whether the actor made a rapid decision in light of the sudden 
emergency and whether that choice was what a person of reasonable 
character would have also made.78  While a driver may not be negligent 
after the emergency arose, the driver may be liable for negligence or 
tortious actions which caused the emergency.79 
Some courts have held a sudden emergency is an affirmative defense,80 
but others have held it is not an affirmative defense and merely precludes 
the plaintiff from fully establishing a negligence case.81  Most commonly, 
the sudden emergency doctrine appears in a case as a jury instruction.82  
Thus, it is the task of the jury to decide whether the driver was confronted 
with a sudden emergency.83  If the jury determines a sudden emergency 
occurred, the jury is then tasked with finding whether the driver acted 
reasonably under the circumstances, which precludes liability, or unrea-
sonably, which imposes liability.84 
b. Criticism 
Jurisdictions questioning the sudden emergency doctrine have focused 
their criticism on whether an instruction confuses or misstates the law to the 
jury, primarily as to the proper standard of care and in conjunction with 
comparative negligence.85  Because the sudden emergency instruction has 
the potential to suggest to the jury that a driver confronted with a sudden 
emergency is afforded a lower standard of care, some courts have abolished 
its use.86  Other courts have eliminated the instruction because it is 
 
77. W.P. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 33, at 196 (5th 
ed. 1984). 
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 3, § 296. 
79. Id. 
80. See Lovings v. Cleary, 799 N.E.2d 76, 78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 
81. See Starns v. Jones, 500 F.2d 1233, 1236 (8th Cir. 1974). 
82. Ghent, supra note 13, at 687.  For example, model jury instructions for Colorado provide 
that “[a] person who, through no fault of his or her own, is placed in a sudden emergency, is not 
chargeable with negligence if the person exercises that degree of care which a reasonably careful 
person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances.”  Young v. Clark, 814 P.2d 
364, 365 (Colo. 1991) (quoting Colorado’s pattern jury “sudden emergency” instruction, CJI-
Civ.2d 9:10). 
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 3, § 296(1) cmt. b. 
84. KEETON ET AL., supra note 77, at 196-97. 
85. Ghent, supra note 13, at 687. 
86. See, e.g., Wiles v. Webb, 946 S.W.2d 685, 689 (Ark. 1997); McClymont v. Morgan, 470 
N.W.2d 768, 771-72 (Neb. 1991); see also Bjorndal v. Weitman, 184 P.3d 1115, 1121 (Or. 2008) 
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subsumed within the doctrine of comparative negligence.87  Still, others 
have merely discouraged using the instruction based on the concerns of 
confusion,88 or have kept the instruction for use when properly requested 
and warranted.89 
2. Unavoidable Accident Doctrine 
Similar to the sudden medical emergency defense and the sudden emer-
gency doctrine, the doctrine of unavoidable accident is self-explanatory, 
providing that circumstances beyond the driver’s control rendered the 
accident unavoidable and, therefore, the driver was not personally 
negligent.90  In other words, the doctrine states “ordinary care and diligence 
could not have prevented [the accident].”91  Although some authority 
equates the unavoidable accident doctrine to a sudden incapacitating 
moment while driving,92 other courts analogize it with the sudden 
emergency doctrine.93  In fact, many of the criticisms of the unavoidable 
accident doctrine resemble those faced by the sudden emergency doctrine.94 
For instance, some states have not permitted the use of the unavoidable 
accident instruction because it “merely restates that law of negligence, 
serves no useful purpose, and overemphasizes the defendant’s case, and is 
apt to confuse and mislead the jury.”95  Other states have strongly criticized 
the instruction due to these concerns,96 but others have allowed the 
 
(“[T]he emergency instruction, at least as used in vehicle accident cases, misstates the law of 
negligence . . . .”). 
87. See, e.g., Knapp v. Stanford, 392 So. 2d 196, 198 (Miss. 1980). 
88. See, e.g., Myhaver v. Knutson, 942 P.2d 445, 450 (Ariz. 1997); Bayer v. Shupe Bros. 
Co., 576 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Kan. 1978) (recommending the doctrine is one for argument by 
counsel); Gagnon v. Crane, 498 A.2d 718, 721 (N.H. 1985). 
89. See, e.g., Young v. Clark, 814 P.2d 364, 369 (Colo. 1991) (“The sudden emergency 
doctrine is a long-established principle of law . . . .  We choose to leave the doctrine intact, and 
continue to uphold the propriety of giving the sudden emergency instruction where competent 
evidence is presented that a party was confronted with a sudden or unexpected occurrence not of 
the party’s own making.”). 
90. 8 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 13, § 1057. 
91. Hancock-Underwood v. Knight, 670 S.E.2d 720, 722 (Va. 2009). 
92. See Tropical Exterminators, Inc. v. Murray, 171 So. 2d 432, 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1965); Parker v. Washington, 421 P.2d 861, 866 (Okla. 1966) (“unavoidable accident by reason of 
sudden unconsciousness”). 
93. See Meyer v. Johnson, 254 N.W.2d 107, 110 (S.D. 1977) (explaining the unavoidable 
accident instruction requires an element of surprise and the sudden emergency doctrine requires a 
sudden and unexpected danger). 
94. See generally Hancock-Underwood, 670 S.E.2d at 723 (explaining the division of state 
viewpoints on the unavoidable accident instruction). 
95. Id. (listing twenty states and the District of Columbia that have abolished the unavoidable 
accident instruction). 
96. Id. (providing fifteen states that have cautiously used or limited the instruction). 
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instruction.97  Considering the various approaches taken by jurisdictions 
applying the sudden medical emergency defense, the sudden emergency 
doctrine, and the unavoidable accident doctrine, the next section of this note 
will attempt to reconcile the three and apply them through North Dakota 
common law and statutory law.98 
III. APPLICATION IN NORTH DAKOTA 
No cases in North Dakota have addressed the sudden medical 
emergency defense and its application to motor vehicle accident lawsuits.  
However, North Dakota has adopted similar doctrines that have been 
utilized in negligence cases.99  This section will first discuss the law in 
North Dakota with regard to the current doctrines in force and statutory 
law.100  Next, this section will examine the likelihood of North Dakota 
adopting the sudden medical emergency defense and how the state would 
do so.101  Finally, this section will describe ways to attack the defense from 
the plaintiff’s perspective and important policy considerations that must be 
addressed when adopting the defense.102 
A. CURRENT CONTROLLING NORTH DAKOTA LAW 
Several doctrines exculpating drivers from liability have been 
developed in North Dakota.103  One doctrine is known as the sudden 
emergency doctrine.104  Another is known as the unavoidable accident 
doctrine.105 
1. Sudden Emergency Doctrine in North Dakota 
The history of the sudden emergency doctrine in North Dakota spans 
many decades.106  Despite the expansive time frame, little changes have 
been made to the jury instruction.107  Today, the model pattern jury 
 
97. Id. (noting nine states that have endorsed the instruction’s use). 
98. See infra Part III. 
99. See Haider v. Finken, 239 N.W.2d 508, 513 (N.D. 1976) (sudden emergency instruction); 
Reuter v. Olson, 59 N.W.2d 830, 835 (N.D. 1953) (unavoidable accident). 
100. See infra Parts III.A.1-3. 
101. See infra Part III.B. 
102. See infra Parts III.C-D. 
103. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
104. Haider, 239 N.W.2d at 513. 
105. Reuter v. Olson, 59 N.W.2d 830, 835 (N.D. 1953). 
106. See, e.g., id. at 834 (describing the sudden emergency instruction in 1953). 
107. Compare id.  (“In an emergency a driver of a vehicle is required only to act in the 
manner of a reasonable, prudent man, and is not to be held liable for failure to choose the wisest 
course of action, if the course he did choose is such as a reasonably prudent man might choose”), 
with Ebach v. Ralston, 510 N.W.2d 604, 608-09 (N.D. 1994) (“If a person is suddenly and 
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instruction in North Dakota for sudden emergency states, “[i]f suddenly 
faced with a dangerous situation the person did not create, the person is not 
held to the same accuracy of judgment as one would be if there were time 
for deliberation.”108  Furthermore, the instruction states, “[t]he person is not 
at fault if the person acted as an ordinary prudent person would act in a 
similar emergency.”109  The North Dakota Supreme Court has explained its 
acceptance of the doctrine through the principle that a driver presented with 
a sudden dangerous situation, whether created by another person or by an 
intervening, unexpected condition, “is not held to the same accuracy of 
judgment as would be required of him if he had time for deliberation.”110  A 
driver is not liable so long as he or she did not cause the emergency by his 
or her own negligence and so long as the driver exercised care as a 
reasonably prudent person would have in the same situation.111 
Like many other jurisdictions, the North Dakota Supreme Court has 
also examined the utility of the sudden emergency doctrine and questioned 
the doctrine’s use.112  While noting concerns of misleading the jury or 
misstating the law, the North Dakota Supreme Court has expressly endorsed 
the sudden emergency instruction, granted the instructions clearly explain 
“[a] driver’s standard of ordinary care under the circumstances of an 
emergency, coupled with instructions about the driver’s standard of 
ordinary care before the emergency arose . . . .”113  Because the court has 
also declared the doctrine consistent with the comparative negligence 
scheme of the state, the instruction is appropriate when warranted.114 
Additionally, the North Dakota Supreme Court has deemed the 
doctrine not a defense at all, but rather “a principle of law.”115  As such, the 
 
unexpectedly confronted with an emergency . . . he or she is not expected, nor required, to use the 
same judgment and prudence that is required of him or her in calmer and more deliberate 
moments.”). 
108. N.D.J.I. Civ. No. C-2.77 (2001). 
109. Id. 
110. Ebach, 510 N.W.2d at 609. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 609-10. 
113. Id. at 610. 
114. Cf. id. at 611 (“When there is conflicting evidence about whether a person’s conduct 
caused the emergency situation, . . . an emergency instruction is justified.”); Haider v. Finken, 239 
N.W.2d 508, 514-15 (N.D. 1976) (“[a]n instruction is properly refused where there is evidence 
that the claimed emergency was caused or contributed to by inattention or lack of vigilance on the 
part of the driver seeking to invoke the rule; or where there is evidence that the driver failed to 
anticipate the peril or to take preventive action; or where the vehicle was operated at an excessive 
or illegal speed at or immediately prior to the accident.”) (internal citations omitted).  In North 
Dakota, modified comparative fault determines liability, meaning a plaintiff may only recover if 
the fault of others exceeds his or her own and any damages are diminished by his amount of fault.  
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (2010). 
115. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass’n v. Briese, 192 N.W.2d 170, 179 (N.D. 1971). 
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sudden emergency instruction is utilized as a general denial of negligence 
and not as a means to escape liability after the elements of negligence have 
been established by the plaintiff.116  Therefore, when a driver is confronted 
with a sudden emergency, North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure do not 
require the defendant to plead the sudden emergency defense.117 
2. Unavoidable Accident Doctrine in North Dakota 
In many respects, the unavoidable accident doctrine is analogous to the 
sudden emergency doctrine in North Dakota.118  Although the unavoidable 
accident doctrine is distinct in North Dakota case law, providing “[t]he 
issue . . . is raised when there is evidence tending to prove that the injury 
resulted from some cause other than the negligence of the parties,”119 the 
doctrine of sudden emergency has a similar definition that merely adds the 
element of an unexpected circumstance.120  Another similarity between the 
doctrines is that an unavoidable accident is not a defense, but a matter of 
law.121  Thus, as the North Dakota Supreme Court also declared with a 
sudden emergency instruction, the issue of unavoidable accident plays a 
role in initially finding a driver negligent rather than as a means to escape 
liability from the plaintiff’s established prima facie case of negligence.122  
Despite familiar criticisms of the doctrine,123 the North Dakota Supreme 
Court has approved the use of instructions for the jury to decide the driver’s 
negligence.124 
3. No-Fault Insurance in North Dakota 
Recognizing the need to provide more compensation for innocent 
victims in motor vehicle accidents, the North Dakota Legislature enacted 
the North Dakota Auto Accident Reparations Act in 1975, providing for 
“no-fault” insurance in chapter 26.1-41 of the North Dakota Century 
 
116. Cf. id. (“The doctrine is . . . to be utilized in determining the issue of negligence. . . .”). 
117. Id. at 178; see also N.D. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (requiring affirmative defenses to be pled). 
118. See generally Reuter v. Olson, 59 N.W.2d 830 (N.D. 1953) (providing an emergency 
and unavoidable accident instruction in the same case).  However, other states have analogized 
unavoidable accident with sudden medical emergency.  See Parker v. Washington, 421 P.2d 861, 
866 (Okla. 1966) (“unavoidable accident by reason of sudden unconsciousness”). 
119. Reuter, 59 N.W.2d at 835. 
120. See, e.g., Ebach v. Ralson, 510 N.W.2d 604, 609 (N.D. 1994). 
121. Walketzko v. Herdegen, 226 N.W.2d 648, 653 (N.D. 1975). 
122. Id. (stating the doctrine is “one aspect of the concept of proximate cause”). 
123. See id. at 653 n.3 (addressing “that unavoidable accident instructions are disapproved 
by a strong and growing minority of jurisdictions and are particularly inappropriate in jurisdictions 
which have adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence”). 
124. Id. at 653; see also Reuter, 59 N.W.2d at 836 (presenting a jury question). 
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Code.125  Under no-fault insurance, the owner of a motor vehicle buys 
insurance that “automatically covers an individual who sustains bodily 
injury in that motor vehicle.”126  As a result, the owner may not sue for non-
economic loss unless serious bodily injury occurred.127  Instead, the 
innocent driver collects from the insurance company and may only sue if 
medical bills meet a threshold of $2500.128 
An innocent driver in an automobile accident who is covered by no-
fault insurance would likely be able to collect the benefits from his or her 
own insurance company so long as the accidental injury occurred while 
occupying his or her motor vehicle.129  However, an incapacitated driver 
covered by no-fault insurance may have a more difficult task of proving the 
no-fault requirements.130  Because the policy of no-fault insurance is “to 
provide coverage for injury resulting directly from motoring accidents,”131 
an accident caused by a sudden medical emergency would not result in an 
injury under the terms of no-fault insurance.  Thus, the no-fault system falls 
short of providing compensation for drivers suffering “from the failure of 
the human body to function properly” as opposed to vehicle operation 
failure.132 
B. ADOPTION OF THE SUDDEN MEDICAL EMERGENCY DEFENSE 
No cases brought to the North Dakota Supreme Court have argued for 
the adoption of the sudden medical emergency defense in a motor vehicle 
case or the validity of the defense.  As an initial step, however, an allegedly 
incapacitated driver may attempt to argue non-liability using the well-
established doctrines from North Dakota common law.133  For example, 
under the sudden emergency doctrine, an incapacitated driver could argue 
the “sudden emergency” of the medical event was not created by the driver 
and that, although an accident occurred, he or she responded to the 
emergency in a way that a reasonable person would have.134  Presuming the 
 




128. The dollar amount is necessary in order to qualify under the definition of “serious 
injury.”  N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-41-01(21) (2008). 
129. See id. § 26.1-41-06. 
130. See generally State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. LaRoque, 486 N.W.2d 235 (N.D. 1992) 
(noting no-fault statutes impose the requirements on the owner of the motor vehicle). 
131. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Gabel, 539 N.W.2d 290, 293 (N.D. 1995) 
(emphasis added). 
132. Id. 
133. See supra Parts III.A.1-2. 
134. See Ebach v. Ralston, 510 N.W.2d 604, 608-09 (N.D. 1994). 
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driver did, in fact, exercise ordinary care given the emergency, he or she 
essentially argues the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of 
negligence, and the driver cannot be held liable.135  A similar argument may 
be made under the unavoidable accident doctrine—that the sudden medical 
emergency rather than the driver caused the accident and resulting 
injuries.136  Ultimately, the issue would be presented to the jury to decide 
whether the event occurred, whether the proper standard of care was given 
in light of the event, and whether the incapacitated driver was negligent.137 
Although the doctrines of sudden emergency and unavoidable accident 
may successfully be utilized in a case of sudden incapacitation while 
driving, adoption of the sudden medical emergency defense in North 
Dakota may be more appropriate as a means to fight liability.  For instance, 
the premise of the sudden emergency doctrine is that the driver somehow 
“acted as a reasonably prudent person, in view of the emergency.”138  In 
contrast, the sudden medical emergency defense suggests no action on the 
part of the incapacitated driver, but rather there was no control at all.139  
Therefore, if the medical event was severe enough to render the driver inca-
pable of driving, and there was no indication the medical event would occur 
prior to the accident, the driver would be in a more advantageous position 
under the sudden medical emergency defense, claiming he or she could not 
be liable.140 
Another advantage to adopting the sudden medical emergency defense 
for the incapacitated driver is the defense may be an affirmative defense 
instead of a principle of law.141  The driver benefits from the affirmative 
defense because, despite many cases of sudden medical emergency going to 
the jury to resolve factual disputes regarding foreseeability and timing of 
the event,142 if the evidence is uncontroverted, the driver may escape 
liability as a matter of law.  In other words, while the sudden emergency 
and unavoidable accident doctrines utilize instructions for the jury to decide 
liability, the evidence presented by the incapacitated driver may indicate 
undisputed unforeseeability of the medical event prior to the accident 
 
135. See Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass’n v. Briese, 192 N.W.2d 170, 179 (N.D. 1971). 
136. See Reuter v. Olson, 59 N.W.2d 830, 835 (N.D. 1953). 
137. Id. at 836. 
138. Rustin v. Smith, 657 A.2d 412, 415 (Md.  Ct. Spec. App. 1995). 
139. Cohen v. Petty, 65 F.2d 820, 821 (D.C. 1933). 
140. See id.  
141. Compare Storjohn v. Fay, 519 N.W.2d 521, 526 (Neb. 1994) (explaining “courts 
generally hold that a loss of consciousness defense is an affirmative defense” to be proven by the 
defendant after the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of negligence against him), with 
Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass’n v. Briese, 192 N.W.2d 170, 179 (N.D. 1971) (explaining the 
emergency doctrine is a principle of law, not an affirmative defense). 
142. Kopstein, supra note 17, at 24-25. 
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sufficient to render judgment immediately for the incapacitated driver.143  
Additionally, although some authority equates arguing sudden inca-
pacitation with unavoidable accident or sudden emergency,144 precluding 
the plaintiff from establishing the prima facie case of negligence against the 
defendant, most jurisdictions accept the defense as an exculpatory use after 
the plaintiff has established all the elements of negligence.145  If this 
majority viewpoint is adopted in North Dakota, the affirmative defense 
would need to be specifically pleaded, in accordance with the North Dakota 
Rules of Civil Procedure.146 
More difficult issues to resolve are which elements would comprise the 
defense and which burden of proof would be required of the defendant to 
sufficiently prove the sudden medical emergency.  The elements of a 
medical event being sudden and unforeseen are uniform.147  Depending on 
how the other elements are defined, though, the medical event may be 
narrowly confined to unconsciousness,148 or may be broader to include all 
events resulting in incapacitation.149  To avoid future litigation resolving the 
definition of “incapacitation” and to avoid the risk of subsuming the other 
possible doctrines in North Dakota requiring unconsciousness as an element 
may be favorable.150 
With regard to the issue of burden of proof, many jurisdictions require 
only a preponderance of the evidence standard.151  However, for policy 
reasons explained below, a higher burden of clear and convincing evidence 
may be necessary.152  While it is likely that the sudden medical emergency 
defense could be adopted in North Dakota, following in line with the 
majority of jurisdictions,153 these important policy considerations must be 
examined to fully understand the defense’s implications. 
C. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
The rationale behind invoking the sudden medical emergency defense 
lies in negligence theory, but the harsh consequences of the defense on a 
 
143. See id. 
144. See Tropical Exterminators, Inc. v. Murray, 171 So. 2d 432, 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1965). 
145. See, e.g., Storjohn, 519 N.W.2d at 526. 
146. See N.D. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
147. Travers, supra note 7, at 330. 
148. See, e.g., Roman v. Estate of Gobbo, 791 N.E.2d 422, 432 (Ohio 2003). 
149. See, e.g., Word v. Jones ex rel. Moore, 516 S.E.2d 144, 147 (N.C. 1999). 
150. But see id. 
151. Freese v. Lemmon, 267 N.W.2d 680, 685-86 (Iowa 1978). 
152. See, e.g., Brannon v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 507 So. 2d 194, 196-97 (La. 1987). 
153. See Travers, supra note 7, at 330. 
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plaintiff’s recovery implicate several policy issues.154  Some of the issues 
were addressed in Roman v. Estate of Gobbo,155 where the appellee 
allegedly suffered an incapacitating heart attack prior to the accident.156  To 
counter the appellee’s sudden medical emergency defense, the appellants 
claimed the defense was contrary to motor safety laws, which were enacted 
not only to protect the public but also to allow recovery for innocent 
victims.157  The Supreme Court of Ohio noted the conflict between tort law 
principles: 
[O]n the one hand, in order to be found negligent, one must act 
unreasonably, i.e., only the blameworthy should be liable for the 
consequences of their actions; and on the other hand, injured 
parties should be compensated for their losses if possible, 
especially when they are totally innocent and could have done 
nothing to avoid the injuries they suffered.158 
To the majority of the court, the public policy argument was unpersuasive 
due to the generally accepted principles of other jurisdictions.159 
While the majority merely sympathized with the appellants, the 
remaining justices found the public policy arguments convincing.160  As one 
justice stated, “[c]ommon sense dictates that the situation should be 
remedied” and the victims of the accident would be subjected to a grossly 
unfair result.161  A practical consideration explained by the dissent was the 
inability of the innocent driver to collect damages or uninsured motorist 
coverage.162  In order to further public policy, the dissent recommended a 
rule allowing injured or killed drivers “to pursue damages against a person 
whose sudden medical emergency resulted in a statutory violation and was 
the proximate cause of the death or injury.”163  Because the innocent driver 
would likely recover either from the incapacitated driver’s liability insur-
ance or his or her own uninsured motorist coverage, a more equitable result 
would be accomplished.164  Another justice, however, suggested legislative 
 
154. See, e.g., Roman v. Estate of Gobbo, 791 N.E.2d 422, 433 (Ohio 2003) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
155. 791 N.E.2d 422 (Ohio 2003). 
156. Roman, 791 N.E.2d at 424. 
157. Id. at 427. 
158. Id. at 426-27. 
159. See id. at 429 (“The significance of appellants’ arguments is weakened by the paucity of 
truly convincing authority they have been able to cite in support of their position.”). 
160. Id. at 433 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). 
161. Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
162. Id. (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). 
163. Id. at 434. 
164. Id.  
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action, rather than judicial fiat, would be more appropriate for public policy 
issues.165 
Other courts have briefly stated the potential unfairness in denying 
recovery to a plaintiff if the defendant suffered a sudden medical emer-
gency.166  Nonetheless, they have disregarded policy arguments in favor of 
the defense.167  Taking the advice of the Roman concurrence, though, may 
lead to legislative enactment providing recovery according to the public’s 
will.168 
Without legislative involvement regarding the sudden medical 
emergency defense, the “no-fault” insurance system of North Dakota may 
provide some compensation for the innocent victim.169  Although the 
injured plaintiff may potentially seek relief without proving the defendant 
driver’s fault through this system, the plaintiff may not be made whole and 
may be more satisfied with judicial intervention.170  Should the plaintiff 
bring the case in court and should the sudden medical emergency defense 
be adopted in North Dakota, knowing ways to attack the defense is crucial 
to an innocent plaintiff’s case in finding some type of recovery.171 
D. ATTACKING THE DEFENSE 
Courts have readily adopted the sudden medical emergency defense, 
noting “as between an innocent injured party and an innocent fainting 
driver, the innocent injured party must suffer.”172  Due to the harsh effect of 
the defense on an innocent victim, a detailed analysis of the particular facts 
involved in an automobile case may uncover ways for the innocent victim 
to attack the defense, particularly by gathering medical data and 
testimony.173 
Although a defendant does not need to produce medical data sup-
porting the defense of sudden medical emergency so long as he or she has 
 
165. Id. at 433 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
166. See Cruz v. United States, 987 F. Supp. 1299, 1304 (D. Haw. 1997) (“This court 
sympathizes with Cruz, an innocent bystander who was truly in the wrong place at the wrong 
time . . . .  Nevertheless, because Kameda was not negligent and the accident was unavoidable, 
Defendant is not liable to Cruz.”). 
167. Id. 
168. See Letter from Robert P. Rutter to William Strubbe and Jan Saurman, Chairmen, Ohio 
State Bar Ass’ns Negligence & Ins. Law Comm. (Oct. 13, 2005) (on file with the author) 
(discussing the need for legislative action to endorse Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Roman). 
169. See discussion supra Part III.A.3; see also N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 26.1-41 (2008). 
170. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-41-08 (an action against a driver secured under no-fault may 
only occur if there was a serious injury while occupying any motor vehicle). 
171. See infra Part III.D. 
172. Bashi v. Wodarz, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 635, 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
173. See infra Part III.D. 
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evidence the medical event occurred, a plaintiff should seek the defendant’s 
medical data through the discovery process for several reasons.174  One 
reason may be to counter the elements of the defense, especially 
“incapacity.”175  For example, some states require unconsciousness to fall 
within the defense,176 but other states may only require an element of inca-
pacitation severe enough for the defendant to have lost control of the 
vehicle.177  Thus, depending on how the elements are defined, uncovering 
the severity of the event may be crucial in establishing whether the defense 
is applicable.178 
Another purpose for seeking medical data plays into the elements of 
foreseeability and timing.179  The defense requires that the medical emer-
gency be unforeseeable and occur prior to the accident rather than 
afterwards.180  In determining the element of timing, testimony about the 
defendant’s behavior immediately following the accident may help a 
plaintiff establish the defendant was never incapacitated when the accident 
actually occurred.181  Other testimony may also rebut the defendant’s claim 
of incapacitation if it reflects the defendant’s driving, whether it was that 
expected of an incapacitated person, or whether a statutory duty was 
breached before incapacitation occurred.182 
Medical testimony about the defendant’s condition may assist for the 
element of foreseeability, as well.183  “Foreseeability focuses on what the 
defendant knew at the time he or she made the decision to operate a vehicle 
and whether that decision was reasonable under the circumstances.”184  
Medical data may reveal sufficient information showing the driver knew or 
should have known a medical emergency could have occurred based on the 
driver’s circumstances and conditions.185  If nothing else, the evidence may 
 
174. See generally Kopstein, supra note 17. 
175. Id. at 24 (noting the varying degrees between states for “incapacity”). 
176. See, e.g., Brannon v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 507 So. 2d 194, 197 (La. 1987) (requiring 
the defendant to have suddenly lost consciousness). 
177. See, e.g., Abreu v. F.E. Dev. Recycling, Inc., 35 So. 3d 968-69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2010) (requiring sudden loss of consciousness or incapacitation resulting in a loss of control); 
Word v. Jones ex rel. Moore, 516 S.E.2d 144, 147 (N.C. 1999) (requiring no unconsciousness for 
the “sudden-incapacitation” defense). 
178. See Kopstein, supra note 17, at 24. 
179. Id. 
180. See 17 AM. JUR. 3D, supra note 23, § 4. 
181. Kopstein, supra note 17, at 25. 
182. Id.; see also Estate of Embry v. GEO Trans. of Ind., Inc., 395 F. Supp. 2d 517, 520-21 
(E.D. Ky. 2005). 
183. Kopstein, supra note 17, at 25. 
184. Id. 
185. See 17 AM. JUR. 3D, supra note 23, § 12. 
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preclude judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant and would 
allow the plaintiff to argue foreseeability to a jury.186 
In addition, an insight into foreseeability may play into the plaintiff’s 
pleading requirements.  Although a sudden medical emergency is typically 
raised as a defense, a plaintiff may preemptively plead the defendant’s 
sudden incapacitation was foreseeable and, thus, driving with such 
knowledge was negligent.187  While the option is available, the allegation of 
a foreseeable medical emergency unnecessarily adds the burden of coming 
forward with evidence of this nature on the plaintiff in addition to the 
required negligence elements.188  So long as the primary basis of liability 
does not require alleging foreseeable incapacitation of the defendant driver, 
pleading only negligence may be an easier evidentiary burden on the 
plaintiff and may require more evidentiary burden on the defendant in 
pleading the defense.189 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Finding a driver negligent in a motor vehicle accident case may be 
more difficult for a plaintiff if the driver alleges a sudden medical 
emergency occurred.  Many jurisdictions have declared that a sudden 
medical emergency is a complete defense, leaving a plaintiff with little to 
no recovery if the event was unforeseeable and sudden.190  In North Dakota, 
the sudden medical emergency defense has not yet been adopted, but 
similar doctrines preclude finding negligent those drivers faced with 
unexpected circumstances, and compensation may be available for innocent 
drivers through “no-fault” insurance.191  Should the defense be adopted in 
North Dakota, the terms of the defense, including the elements and burdens 
of proof, must be clearly defined and policy issues must be thoroughly 
considered.192 
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